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Abstract
Robust machine learning formulations have emerged to address the prevalent
vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples. Our work draws
the connection between optimal robust learning and the privacy-utility tradeoff
problem, which is a generalization of the rate-distortion problem. The saddle point
of the game between a robust classifier and an adversarial perturbation can be found
via the solution of a maximum conditional entropy problem. This information-
theoretic perspective sheds light on the fundamental tradeoff between robustness
and clean data performance, which ultimately arises from the geometric structure of
the underlying data distribution and perturbation constraints. Further, we show that
under mild conditions, the worst case adversarial distribution with Wasserstein-ball
constraints on the perturbation has a fixed point characterization. This is obtained
via the first order necessary conditions for optimality of the derived maximum
conditional entropy problem. This fixed point characterization exposes the interplay
between the geometry of the ground cost in the Wasserstein-ball constraint, the
worst-case adversarial distribution, and the given reference data distribution.
1 Introduction
The widespread susceptibility of neural networks to adversarial examples [1, 2] has been demonstrated
through a wide variety of practical attacks [3–9]. This has motivated much research towards mitigating
these vulnerabilities, although many earlier defenses have been shown to be ineffective [10–12]. We
focus our attention on robust learning formulations that aim for guaranteed resiliency against the
worst-case input perturbations or in a distributional sense. Our work draws the information-theoretic
connections between optimal robust learning and the privacy-utility tradeoff problem. We utilize this
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perspective to shed light on the fundamental tradeoff between robustness and clean data performance,
and to inspire novel algorithms for optimizing robust models.
The influential approach of [13] proposes the robust optimization formulation given by
min
θ
EPX,Y
[
max
δ∈S
`(fθ(X + δ), Y )
]
,
where δ represents the worst-case over some set S of small perturbations applied to the input of
the model fθ (parameterized by θ), since the maximization is applied for each instance within the
expectation over the pair (X,Y ). This formulation has inspired a plethora of defenses: some that
tackle the problem directly (albeit with limitations to scalability) [14–18] and others that employ
approximate bounding [19–23] or noise injection [24–26] to provide certified robustness guarantees.
In order to both generalize this formulation and to establish the connection to the privacy problem,
we consider a strengthened adversary by allowing mixed strategies, which is captured with the
perturbation as a channel PZ|X,Y in the formulation
min
θ
max
PZ|X,Y ∈D
EPX,Y PZ|X,Y [`(fθ(Z), Y )],
where D represents the set of channels that produce small perturbations. In the case of training a
classifier via cross-entropy loss, the model fθ provides an approximation of the posterior qθ(Y |Z)
and `(fθ(Z), Y ) = − log qθ(Y |Z). We study the fundamentally optimal value for the ideal robust
learning game by instead considering the minimization over all decision rules q(Y |Z) instead of a
particular parametric family. Under this perspective, we show the following minimax result, with
Theorems 1 and 2, that reduces the problem to a maximum conditional entropy problem,
min
q(Y |Z)
max
PZ|X,Y ∈D
E[− log q(Y |Z)] = max
PZ|X,Y ∈D
min
q(Y |Z)
E[− log q(Y |Z)] = max
PZ|X,Y ∈D
H(Y |Z),
This maximum entropy perspective is equivalent to the information-theoretic treatment of the privacy-
utility tradeoff problem [27–31], where the aim is to design a distortion-constrained data perturbation
mechanism (corresponding to PZ|X,Y ) that maximizes the uncertainty about sensitive information
(represented by Y ). The equivalence between the maximin problem and maximum conditional
entropy is used by [28] to argue from an adversarial perspective, where q represents an privacy
attacker that aims to infer the sensitive data, that conditional entropy (or equivalently, mutual
information) measures privacy against an inference attack. This perspective is adopted in the learning
frameworks of [32, 33], where adversarial networks are trained toward solving this maximin problem.
Figure 1 illustrates the connection between the robustness and privacy problems.
Ensuring distributional robustness provides even more general guarantees, by considering the worst-
case data distribution over some set D, for which we similarly have
min
q(Y |Z)
max
PX,Y ∈D
E[− log q(Y |X)] = max
PX,Y ∈D
H(Y |X),
reducing again to a constrained maximum conditional entropy problem. Distributional robustness
subsumes the earlier expected distortion constraint as a special case when D is a Wasserstein-ball
with a suitably chosen ground metric. In Theorem 3, we show that the maximum conditional entropy
problem over a Wasserstein-ball constraint has a fixed point characterization, which exposes the
interplay between the geometry of the ground cost in the Wasserstein-ball constraint, the worst-case
adversarial distribution, and the given reference data distribution.
We also examine the fundamental tradeoff between model robustness and clean data performance from
our information-theoretic perspective. This tradeoff ultimately arises from the geometric structure
of the underlying data distribution and the adversarial perturbation constraints. We illustrate these
tradeoffs with the numerical analysis of a toy example.
Additional Related Work In [34], a similar minimax theorem is derived, however technical condi-
tions prevent its direct applicability to adversarial data perturbation, and much of their development
focuses on the case where the marginal distribution for the data X remains fixed. The similarities
between the robust learning and privacy problems are noted by [35], however, they only state the
minimax inequality relating the two. The fundamental tradeoff between clean data and adversarial
loss was first theoretically addressed by [36]. This theory was further expanded upon by [37] and
leveraged to develop an improved adversarial training defense.
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(X,Y )
perturbation
PZ|X,Y ∈ D Z
classifier
q(y|Z) E[− log q(Y |Z)]
cross-entropy loss
Robust Learning
minq maxP
Privacy-Utility
maxP minq
Figure 1: The Robust Learning and Privacy-Utility Tradeoff problems both involve a game between a
classifier and a perturbation that can change its input, but within some constraints. In robust learning,
the goal is a classifier that is robust to the adversarial perturbation, and is posed as a minimax problem.
The alternative maximin optimization captures the privacy-utility tradeoff problem, where the goal is
a perturbation mechanism that hides sensitive information from an adversarial classifier that aims to
recover it. Our minimax result shows that these two problems are equivalent.
Notation We use P(Z|X ,Y) to denote the set of conditional probability distributions over Z given
variables over the sets X and Y , and P(Y|X ) is similarly defined.
2 Robust Machine Learning
The influential robust learning formulation of [13] addresses the worst-case attack, as given by
min
θ
E
[
max
Z∈X :
d(X,Z)≤
`(fθ(Z), Y )
]
, (1)
where d : X × X → [0,∞] is some suitably chosen distortion metric (e.g., often `0, `p, or `∞
distance), and  ≥ 0 represents the allowable perturbation. The robust learning formulation in (1)
can be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game, where the adversary (corresponding to the inner
maximization) plays second using a pure strategy by picking a fixed Z subject to the distortion
constraint. We will instead consider an adversary that utilizes a mixed strategy, where Z ∈ X =: Z
can be a randomized function of (X,Y ) as specified by a conditional distribution PZ|X,Y . This is
expressed by a revised formulation given by
min
θ
max
PZ|X,Y ∈D∗d,
E[`(fθ(Z), Y )], (2)
where the expectation is over (X,Y, Z) ∼ PX,Y PZ|X,Y , and the distortion limit is given by
D∗d, := {PZ|X,Y ∈ P(Z|X ,Y) : Pr[d(X,Z) ≤ ] = 1}. (3)
Note that under this maximum distortion constraint, allowing mixed strategies does not actually
strengthen the adversary, i.e., the games in (1) and (2) have the same value. However, if we replace
the distortion limit constraint of (3) with an average distortion constraint, given by
Dd, := {PZ|X,Y ∈ P(Z|X ,Y) : E[d(X,Z)] ≤ }, (4)
then the adversary is potentially strengthened, i.e.,
max
PZ|X,Y ∈Dd,
E[`(fθ(Z), Y )] ≥ max
PZ|X,Y ∈D∗d,
E[`(fθ(Z), Y )].
2.1 Distributional Robustness
Since the objective E[`(fθ(Z), Y )] only depends only the joint distribution of the variables (Z, Y ) ∈
X × Y , the robust learning formulation is straightforward to generalize by instead considering the
maximization over an arbitrary set of joint distributions D ⊂ P(X ,Y). With a change of variable
(replacing Z with X to simplify presentation), this formulation becomes
min
θ
max
p∈D
E(X,Y )∼p[`(fθ(X), Y )], (5)
which includes the scenarios considered in (1) through (4) as special cases. However, unlike these
earlier formulations, (5) allows for the label variable Y to be potentially changed as well.
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Another particular case for D is the Wasserstein-ball around a distribution µ ∈ P(X ,Y), as given by
DW (µ) := {ν ∈ P(X ,Y) : Wd(µ, ν) ≤ }, (6)
where Wd is the 1-Wasserstein distance [38–40] for some ground metric (or in general a cost) d on
the space X × Y . Recall that the 1-Wasserstein distance is given by
Wd(µ, ν) := inf
γ∈Γ(µ,ν)
Eγ
[
d
(
(X,Y ), (X ′, Y ′)
)]
,
where the set of couplings Γ(µ, ν) is defined as all joint distributions with the marginals (X,Y ) ∼ µ
and (X ′, Y ′) ∼ ν. Note that maximizing over p ∈ DW (PX,Y ) is equivalent to maximizing over
channels PX′,Y ′|X,Y subject to the distortion expected constraint E
[
d
(
(X,Y ), (X ′, Y ′)
] ≤ , where
(X,Y,X ′, Y ′) ∼ PX,Y PX′,Y ′|X,Y . Unlike the formulation considered in (2), this channel may also
change the label Y . However, if modifying Y is prohibited by a distortion metric of the form
d
(
(x, y), (x′, y′)
)
=
{
d(x, x′), if y = y′,
∞, otherwise, (7)
then the 1-Wasserstein distributionally robust learning formulation is equivalent to the earlier formu-
lation in (2) with the average distortion constraint given by (4). Robust-ML with Wasserstein-ball
constraints is also referred to as Distributional Robust Optimization (DRO), which appeared in seminal
works of [41–45] and used in for e.g. [46, 47] for Robust-ML applications. In essence it was shown
that DRO is approximately equivalent to imposing Lipschitz constraints on the classifier [45, 48],
which can be incorporated into the optimization routine. There is however no characterization of the
optimal value of the min-max problem in this setting.
2.2 Optimal Robust Learning
The specifics of the loss function ` and model fθ are crucial to analysis. Hence, we will focus
specifically on learning classification models, where X ∈ X represents the data features, Y ∈ Y :=
{1, . . . ,m} represent class labels, and the model fθ : X → [0, 1]m can be viewed as producing
qθ ∈ P(Y|X ) that aims to approximate the underlying posterior PY |X . When cross-entropy is the
loss function, i.e., `(fθ(X), Y ) = − log qθ(Y |X), the expected loss, with respect to some distribution
(X,Y ) ∼ p = PXPY |X , is given by
Ep[− log qθ(Y |X)] =
∫
X
∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y|x) log
PY |X(y|x)
qθ(y|x)PY |X(y|x) dPX(x)
= KL(PY |X(y|X)‖qθ(y|X)|PX) +H(Y |X). (8)
Thus, the principle of learning via minimizing the expected cross-entropy loss optimizes the approxi-
mate posterior qθ(y|x) toward the underlying posterior PY |X , and the loss is lower bounded by the
conditional entropy H(Y |X), which is arguably nonzero for nontrivial classification problems.
The robust learning problem, given by
min
θ
max
p∈D
E(X,Y )∼p[− log qθ(Y |X)], (9)
still critically depends on the specific parametric family (e.g., neural network architecture) chosen
for the model {fθ}θ∈Θ, which determines the corresponding parametric family of approximate
posteriors, i.e., {qθ ∈ P(Y|X )}θ∈Θ. Motivated by the ultimate meta-objective of determining the
best architectures for robust learning, we consider the idealized optimal robust learning formulation
where the minimization is performed over all conditional distributions q ∈ P(Y|Z), as given by
min
q∈P(Y|Z)
max
p∈D
E(X,Y )∼p[− log q(Y |X)], (10)
which clearly lower-bounds (9), which is specific to the particular parametric family.
3 The Privacy-Utility Tradeoff Problem
In the information-theoretic treatment of the privacy-utility tradeoff problem, the random variables
(X,Y ) ∼ PX,Y respectively denote useful and sensitive data, and the aim is to release data Z pro-
duced from a randomized algorithm specified by a channel PZ|X,Y , while simultaneously preserving
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privacy with respect to the sensitive variable Y and maintaining utility with respect to the useful
variable X . Although privacy can be quantified in various ways (cf. [49–51]), we will focus on
a particular information-theoretic approach (see [27–31]) that utilizes mutual information I(Y ;Z)
to measure the privacy leakage, with the aim of making this small in order to preserve privacy.
Utility is quantified with respect to a distortion function, d : X × Z → [0,∞), which is suitably
chosen for the particular application. Minimizing (or limiting) the distortion d(X,Z) captures the
objective of maintaining the utility of the data release. Since the useful and sensitive data (X,Y )
are correlated (and indeed the problem is uninteresting if they are independent), a tradeoff naturally
emerges between the two objectives of preserving privacy and utility.
3.1 Optimal Privacy-Utility Tradeoff
The optimal privacy-utility tradeoff problem is formulated as an information-theoretic optimization
problem in [27, 28], as given by
arg min
PZ|X,Y ∈Dd,
I(Y ;Z) = arg max
PZ|X,Y ∈Dd,
H(Y |Z), (11)
where (X,Y, Z) ∼ PX,Y PZ|X,Y , the constraintDd,, as given in (4), captures the expected distortion
budget, and the equivalence follows from I(Y ;Z) = H(Y ) − H(Y |Z) since H(Y ) is constant.
Similarly, one could consider the alternative maximum distortion constraint D∗d,, given in (3).
3.2 Adversarial Formulation of Privacy
In [28], the privacy-utility problem in (11), is derived from a broader perspective that poses privacy
as maximizing the loss of an adversary that mounts a statistical inference attack attempting to recover
the sensitive Y from the release Z. Their framework considers an adversary that can observe the
release Z and choose a conditional distribution q ∈ P(Y|Z) to minimize its expected loss. As
observed in [28], when cross-entropy (or “self-information”) is the loss, we have that
min
q∈P(Y|Z)
E[− log q(Y |Z)] = H(Y |Z), (12)
with the optimum q∗ = pY |Z , which follows from a derivation similar to (8). Thus, the optimal
privacy-utility tradeoff given in (11) is equivalent to a maximin problem, as stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (equivalence of privacy formulations [28]). For any joint distribution PX,Y and closed,
convex constraint set D ⊂ P(Z|X ,Y), e.g., D∗d, or Dd,, as given by (3) or (4), we have
max
PZ|X,Y ∈D
min
q∈P(Y|Z)
E[− log q(Y |Z)] = max
PZ|X,Y ∈D
H(Y |Z)
= H(Y )− min
PZ|X,Y ∈D
I(Y ;Z),
where (X,Y, Z) ∼ PX,Y PZ|X,Y .
3.3 Connections to Rate-Distortion Theory
The privacy-utility tradeoff problem is also highly related to rate-distortion theory, which considers
the efficiency of lossy data compression. When X = Y , the optimization problem in (11) immedi-
ately reduces to the single-letter characterization of the optimal rate-distortion tradeoff. However,
the privacy problem considers an inherently single-letter scenario, where we deal with just a single
instance of the variables (X,Y, Z), which could naturally be high-dimensional, but have no restric-
tions placed on their statistical structure across these dimensions. Another related approach [52, 53]
considers an asymptotic coding formulation that replaces (X,Y ) with vectors of iid samples and also
adds coding efficiency into the consideration of a three-way rate-privacy-utility tradeoff.
4 Main Results : Duality between Optimal Robust Learning and
Privacy-Utility Tradeoffs
The solution to the optimal minimax robust learning problem can be found via a maximum conditional
entropy problem related to the privacy-utility tradeoff problem.
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Theorem 1. For any finite sets X and Y , and closed, convex set of joint distributions D ⊂ P(X ,Y),
we have
min
q∈P(Y|X )
max
p∈D
E[− log q(Y |X)] (13)
= max
p∈D
min
q∈P(Y|X )
E[− log q(Y |X)] (14)
= max
p∈D
H(Y |X) =: h∗ ≤ log |Y|, (15)
where the expectations and entropy are with respect to (X,Y ) ∼ p. Further, the solutions for
q ∈ P(Y|X ) that minimize (13) are given by⋂
p∈D
{
q ∈ P(Y|X ) : E(X,Y )∼p[− log q(Y |X)] ≤ h∗
} 6= ∅. (16)
Proof. See Appendix in the supplementary material.
Intuitively, the optimal minimax robust decision rule q that solves (13) must be consistent with the
posterior p(y|x) corresponding to the solution of the maximum conditional entropy problem in (15).
However, a given posterior p(y|x) is well-defined only over the support of the marginal distribution
of X , whereas the robust decision rule needs to be defined over the entire space X . Hence, generally,
determining the robust decision rule over the entirety of X requires considering the solution set
in (16), which seems cumbersome, but can be simplified in many cases via the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the paradigm of Theorem 1, let
D∗ := {p ∈ D : H(Y |X) = h∗, (X,Y ) ∼ p}.
For all p∗ ∈ D∗, the corresponding terms of (16) are given by
Q(p∗) :=
{
q ∈ P(Y|X ) : E(X,Y )∼p∗ [− log q(Y |X)] ≤ h∗
}
=
{
q ∈ P(Y|X ) : ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y, q(y|x)p∗(x) = p∗(x, y)}.
Further, if ⋃
p∗∈D∗
{
x ∈ X : p∗(x) > 0} = X ,
then the solution set given by (16), for the minimization of (13), contains exactly one point and is
given by ⋂
p∗∈D∗
Q(p∗) =
⋂
p∈D
Q(p).
In the simplest case, if there exists a p∗ ∈ D∗ that has full support over X (in the marginal distribution
for X), then the optimal robust decision rule that solves the minimization of (13) is simply given by
the posterior p∗(y|x), which is defined for all x ∈ X .
4.1 Generalization to Arbitrary Alphabets
Extending the result in the previous section to continuousX requires one to expand the set of allowable
Markov kernels, i.e., conditional probabilities, to what is referred to as the set of generalized decision
rules in statistical decision theory [54–57]. This is because the set of Markov kernels is not compact,
while the set of generalized decision rules is. For any f ∈ Cb(Y), set of bounded continuous
functions, and any bounded signed measure ϕ on X , given a mapping q(Y |X) (interpret this as a
measurable function qx over Y for each fixed x), define a bilinear functional via,
βq(Y |X)(f, ϕ) =
∫
X
∫
Y
f(y)q(dy|dx)dϕ(x). (17)
Definition 1. [54] A generalized decision function is a bilinear function β : Cb(Y)× ϕ→ R that
satisfies, (a) if f ≥ 0, ϕ ≥ 0 =⇒ β(f, ϕ) ≥ 0, (b) |β(f, ϕ)| ≤ ‖f‖∞‖ϕ‖TV , (c) β(1, ϕ) =
‖ϕ‖TV ifϕ ≥ 0.
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Define the set of generalized decision rules as the set of bi-linear functions defined via (17) and
satisfying the properties (a), (b), (c) above.
M = {q(Y |X) : q(Y |X) satisfies a. b. c. in Def. 1 via (17) } (18)
Applying these results, we obtain the following theorem for the case of general alphabets X . Note
that in contrast to Theorem 1, here the results hold with inf, sup instead of min,max.
Theorem 2. Under the paradigm of Theorem 1, for continuous alphabets X and discrete Y ,
inf
q∈M
sup
p∈D
Ep[− log q(Y |X)] = sup
p∈D
H(Y |X) (19)
Proof. Using the fact that the setM is convex and compact for the weak topology (Theorem 42.3,
[54]), that the function Ep[− log q(Y |X)] is convex in q for all q ∈ M, and applying the minimax
theorem [58],
inf
q∈M
sup
p∈D
Ep[− log q(Y |X)] = sup
p∈D
inf
q∈M
Ep[− log q(Y |X)]. (20)
The result then follows by noting that, infq∈M Ep[− log q(Y |X)] = H(Y |X). This result implies
that even in the case of continuous alphabets, the worst case algorithm independent adversarial
perturbation can be computed by solving for supp∈DH(Y |X).
5 Implications of the main results
5.1 A fixed point characterization of the worst case perturbation
We consider the particular case when D is the Wasserstein-ball around a distribution µ ∈ P(X ,Y):
DW (µ) := {ν ∈ P(X ,Y) : Wd(µ, ν) ≤ },
and derive the necessary conditions for optimality for the solution to supν∈DHν(Y |X), where by
the subscript in the conditional entropy we highlight the fact that the conditional entropy is computed
under the joint distribution ν. To this end we adopt a Lagrangian viewpoint and we assume that X
and Y are continuous bounded and compact sets, but the result can be seen to hold true when X is
continuous and Y is discrete. The result is summarized in the Theorem below.
Theorem 3. If the cost d is continuous with continuous first derivative and the distribution µ(x, y)
is supported on the whole of the domain X × Y , the optimal solution to arg minνWd(ν, µ) −
λHν(Y |X) for some λ > 0 satisfies,
ϕν→µ(x, y) = λ(log(ν(x, y))− u(y) log ν(x)) + C, (21)
where ϕν→µ(x, y) is the Kantorovich Potential 2corresponding to the optimal solution to the transport
problem from ν to µ under the ground cost d, capital C is a constant, u(y) is a uniform distribution
over Y , and ν(x) = ∫
y
ν(x, y) is the marginal distribution under the joint ν(x, y).
Proof. See Appendix in the supplementary material.
This characterization ties closely the geometry of the perturbations (as reflected via the Kantorovich
Potential) with the worst case distribution that maximizes the conditional entropy.
The algorithmic implications of this fixed point relation will be undertaken in an upcoming manuscript.
5.2 Robustness vs Clean Data Loss Tradeoffs
A natural question to ask is whether robustness comes at a price. It has been observed empirically that
robust models will underperform on clean data in comparison to conventional, non-robust models. To
understand why this is fundamentally unavoidable, we examine the loss for robust and non-robust
models in combination with clean data or under adversarial attack.
2Kantorovich Potential is the variable of optimization in the dual problem to the optimal transport problem.
We refer the reader to [38, 39] and [40] for these definitions and notions related to theory of Optimal Transport.
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Let µ ∈ D denote the unperturbed (clean data) distribution within the set of potential adversarial
attacks D. For a given decision rule q ∈ P(Y|X ) and distribution ν = νXνY |X ∈ P(X ,Y), recall
that the cross-entropy loss is given by (8) as
L(ν, q) := Ep[− log q(Y |X)] = Hν(Y |X) + KL(νY |X‖q(y|X)|νX).
The baseline loss of the ideal non-robust model for clean data is given by
min
q
L(µ, q) = Hµ(Y |X).
Under adversarial attack, the ideal loss of the robust model is given by Theorem 1 as
min
q
max
ν∈D
L(ν, q) = max
ν∈D
Hν(Y |X).
For a robust model q∗ that solves (13), which is characterized by (16), its loss under the clean data
distribution µ is given by
L(µ, q∗) = Hµ(Y |X) + KL(µY |X‖q∗(y|X)|µX).
The KL-divergence term must be finite, since we have
Hµ(Y |X) = min
q
L(µ, q) ≤ L(µ, q∗) ≤ min
q
max
ν∈D
L(ν, q) = max
ν∈D
Hν(Y |X),
where the second inequality follows from q∗ being the minimax solution.
Figure 2: Left: Loss as a function of decision rule, varying rule, and across attacks varying attack.
Right: Loss as a function of attack distortion, varying attack, and across decision rules varying rule.
We numerically evaluate these tradeoffs by considering a family of Wasserstein-ball constraint sets
D(), as given by (6), with varying radius  ≥ 0 around a distribution µ over finite alphabets
X = Y = {1, . . . , 5}. The ground metric is of the form given in (7), which effectively limits the
perturbation to only changing X within an expected squared-distance distortion constraint of , as
equivalent to (4). The distribution µ was randomly chosen, and has entropies Hµ(Y ) ≈ 1.6 and
Hµ(Y |X) ≈ 0.34 (in nats).
Leveraging Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we numerically solve for the robust decision rules,
q∗rule = arg min
q∈P(Y|X )
max
ν∈D(rule)
L(ν, q),
across a range distortion constraints rule ∈ [0, 2]. In combination with each decision rule, we consider
the loss under attacks at varying distortion limits attack ∈ [0, 2], as given by
L(attack, rule) := max
ν∈D(attack)
L(ν, q∗rule).
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Figure 2 plots the loss L(attack, rule) across the combination of attack and rule. On the left of Figure 2,
each curve is a fixed attack distortion attack, over which the decision rule q∗rule is varied, with the
optimal loss obtained when rule = attack. As rule increases, the loss for all curves converge toHµ(Y ).
In the right of Figure 2, the dotted black curve is the maximum conditional entropy Hν(Y |X) over
ν ∈ D(attack) at each attack, which corresponds to the ideal robust loss when rule = attack. The other
curves are each a fixed decision rule q∗rule , over which the attack distortion attack is varied, which
exhibits suboptimal loss for mismatched rule 6= attack. The beginning of each curve, at attack = 0, is
the clean data loss for each rule, and we can see that clean data loss is degraded as robustness for
higher distortions attack is improved. In the extreme of a decision rule designed to be robust for very
high rule = 1.95, the loss is uniformly equal to Hµ(Y ) across all attack, since this robust decision
rule q∗1.95 only simply guesses the prior µY .
Broader Impact
As a theory paper regarding the problem of robust learning that addresses the threat posed by
adversarial example attack, short-term ethical or societal consequences are not expected. The
potential long-term upside of our work is that better theoretical understanding of these issues may
lead to the development and application of more resilient machine learning technology to better
address safety, security, and reliability concerns. A corresponding risk is that progress toward
expanding fundamental knowledge may also be leveraged to realize more sophisticated attacks that
may undermine already widely deployed AI systems. However, the advancement of attacks is perhaps
inevitable, and, hence, research into defenses must be conducted.
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6 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. The relations in (15) and the existence of the maximums and minimum in (14) and (15) follow from a
straightforward generalization of Lemma 1. The rest of the proof follows the same general steps as the proof of a
generalized minimax theorem given by [58], except adapted for minimums and maximums rather than infimums
and supremums.
For convenience, we define
f(p, q) := E(X,Y )∼p[− log q(Y |X)]− h∗, (22)
Q(p) :=
{
q ∈ P(Y|X ) : f(p, q) ≤ 0}. (23)
Note that f(p, q) is linear in p for fixed q, and convex in q for fixed p. Further, for all p ∈ D,
minq∈P(Y|X ) f(p, q) ≤ 0 and Q(p) is compact, convex, and nonempty.
We only need to show that (13) is less than or equal to (14), which would follow from ∩p∈DQ(p) 6= ∅, which
is equivalent to (16). Since, each Q(p) is compact, it is sufficient to show that ∩p∈D0Q(p) 6= ∅ for every finite
subset D0 ⊂ D [59, Thm. 2.36]. We will first show this for any two-point set D0 = {p1, p2}, and later extend
this to every finite set through an inductive argument.
Suppose Q(p1) ∩Q(p2) = ∅, then a contradiction would occur if we can show that there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such
that for all q ∈ P(Y|X ),
(1− α)f(p1, q) + αf(p2, q) > 0, (24)
since then minq∈P(Y|X ) f(pα, q) > 0, where pα := (1− α)p1 + αp2.
For q /∈ Q(p1)∪Q(p2), we immediately have (24), since both f(p1, q) > 0 and f(p2, q) > 0. For (24) to hold
for all q ∈ Q(p1), we must require
α > sup
q1∈Q(p1)
−f(p1, q1)
f(p2, q1)− f(p1, q1) . (25)
The supremum is ≥ 0, since f(p1, q1) ≤ 0 and f(p2, q1) > 0, from the assumption Q(p1) ∩ Q(p2) = ∅.
For (24) to hold for all q ∈ Q(p2), we must also require
α < inf
q2∈Q(p2)
f(p1, q2)
f(p1, q2)− f(p2, q2) . (26)
The infimum is ≤ 1, since f(p2, q2) ≤ 0 and f(p1, q2) > 0, from the assumption Q(p1) ∩Q(p2) = ∅. Thus,
an α satisfying both (25) and (26) exists if and only if for all q1 ∈ Q(p1) and q2 ∈ Q(p2),
−f(p1, q1)
f(p2, q1)− f(p1, q1) <
f(p1, q2)
f(p1, q2)− f(p2, q2) ,
or equivalently,
f(p1, q1)f(p2, q2) < f(p1, q2)f(p2, q1). (27)
Since (27) is immediate if either f(p1, q1) = 0 or f(p2, q2) = 0, we need only consider when both f(p1, q1) <
0 and f(p2, q2) < 0. Define θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
(1− θ)f(p1, q1) + θf(p1, q2) = 0, (28)
and let qθ := (1 − θ)q1 + θq2. Since f is convex in q, f(p1, qθ) ≤ 0, which implies that qθ ∈ Q(p1) hence
qθ /∈ Q(p2) (since we assumed that they are disjoint), which further implies that
(1− θ)f(p2, q1) + θf(p2, q2) ≥ f(p2, qθ) > 0. (29)
Thus, by combining (28) and (29),
−f(p1, q1)
f(p1, q2)
=
θ
1− θ <
f(p2, q1)
−f(p2, q2) ,
which implies (27) and the existence of α, which contradicts the assumption that Q(p1) ∩Q(p2) = ∅.
The pairwise resultQ(p1)∩Q(p2) 6= ∅ implies that for any finite setD0 = {p1, . . . , pm},Q(p1)∩Q(pi) 6= ∅
for i = 2, . . . ,m. Then, we can repeat the argument starting from (22) with q further restricted to Q(p1), i.e.,
replacing P(Y|X ) in subsequent steps with Q(p1), which effectively redefines (23) with Q′(p) := Q(p) ∩
Q(p1), and eventually leads to Q(p1) ∩Q(p2) ∩Q(pi) 6= ∅ for i = 3, . . . ,m. Thus, repeating this argument
further yields that ∩p∈D0Q(p) 6= ∅ for any finite subset D0 ⊂ D, which, as argued earlier, implies (16).
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7 Proof of Theorem 3
All the proof steps assume continuous and compact X ,Y but it is easy to see that the steps hold true for discrete
and finite Y and continuous X . We begin with the following definition that is taken from Chapter 7 in [38].
Definition 2. Given a functional F (ρ) : P → R, if ρ is a regular point3 of F , and for any perturbation
χ = ρ− ρ˜, ρ˜ ∈ P ∩ L∞c (Ω), one calls δFδρ (ρ) the first variation of F (ρ) if
d
dε
F (ρ+ εχ)|ε=0 =
∫
δF
δρ
(ρ)dχ (30)
It can be seen that the first variations are unique up a constant. The proof then follows from the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 2. [38] The first variation of a the optimal transport cost Wd(ν, µ) with respect to ν is given by the
Kontorovich potential, ϕν→ν , provided it is unique. A sufficient condition for uniqueness of ϕν→ν is that the
cost c is continuous with continuous first derivative and µ is supported on the whole of the domain.
Lemma 3. The first variation of the conditional entropy function defined by
Hν(Y |X) =
∫
ν(x, y) log
ν(x, y)∫
y
ν(x, y)
dxdy, (31)
is given by log(ν(x, y))− u(y) log ν(x), where u(y) is a uniform distribution over Y and ν(x) is the marginal
over X under the joint ν(x, y).
Proof. Notation: In the following to be concise and avoid a cumbersome notation we will often not explicitly
write χ(x, y) but just use χ. On the other hand we will keep explicit the notation ν(x, y) so as to not lose sight
of it.
By definition consider a perturbation εχ around ν and let us look at
d
dε
∫
(ν(x, y) + εχ) log
(ν(x, y) + εχ)∫
y
(ν(x, y) + εχ)
dxdy (32)
=
d
dε
∫
(ν(x, y) + εχ) log(ν(x, y) + εχ)dxdy − d
dε
∫
(ν(x, y) + εχ) log(
∫
y
(ν(x, y) + εχ))dxdy
(33)
=
d
dε
∫
(ν(x, y) + εχ) log(ν(x, y) + εχ)dxdy − d
dε
∫
(ν(x) + εf(χ)) log(ν(x) + εf(χ)))dxdy
(34)
where f(χ) =
∫
y
χ(x, y)dy. Let us focus on the first term.
d
dε
∫
(ν(x, y) + εχ) log(ν(x, y) + εχ)dxdy
=
∫
d
dε
ν(x, y) log(ν(x, y) + εχ)dxdy +
∫
d
dε
εχ log(ν(x, y) + εχ)dxdy (35)
=
∫
ν(x, y)
χ
(ν(x, y) + εχ)
dxdy +
∫
log(ν(x, y) + εχ)χ+
∫
εχ2
(ν(x, y) + εχ)
dxdy (36)
From this we conclude that,
d
dε
∫
(ν(x, y) + εχ) log(ν(x, y) + εχ)dxdy|ε=0 =
∫
(1 + log(ν(x, y))χdxdy (37)
Now let us look at the second term. Following the same arguments as for the first term we have,
d
dε
∫
(ν(x) + εf(χ)) log(ν(x) + εf(χ)))dxdy|ε=0 =
∫
(log(ν(x)) + 1)f(χ)dxdy (38)
Now we note that, ∫
(log ν(x) + 1)f(χ)dxdy =
∫
(u(y) log ν(x) + 1)χdxdy (39)
where u(y) is the uniform distribution over Y . Therefore we have,
d
dε
Hν+εχ(Y |X)|ε=0 =
∫
(log(ν)− u(y) log ν(x))χdxdy (40)
3See Chapter 7, [38] for definition of a regular point.
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8 Differences versus Farnia and Tse’s Minimax Result
The strong version of the minimax result from [34, Thm. 1.B] requires a continuity assumption on f(p, q), as
defined in (22), with respect to p ∈ D. This continuity assumption is stated in the following Proposition 1 and
is generally false, except for particular choices of D that may limit the applicability of their minimax result
toward addressing general adversarial examples. Our minimax results in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 avoid this
assumption and its limitations.
Proposition 1. If a sequence (pn)∞n=1 ∈ D converges to p0 ∈ D, and qn := arg minq f(pn, q), then for any
p ∈ D, f(p, qn) converges to f(p, q0).
Remark 1. If the marginal distribution for X is fixed over all joint distributions in D, then Proposition 1 is
true. Much of the developments in [34] are constructed within this assumption.
Remark 2. For general D where the marginal distribution for X may vary, Proposition 1 may be false, as
shown with the following example.
Let X = Y = {0, 1}, and D be all joint distributions over X × Y . Consider the sequence of distributions
pn(x, y) :=

1/2, if (x, y) = (0, 0),
(n− 1)/2n, if (x, y) = (0, 1),
0, if (x, y) = (1, 0),
1/2n, if (x, y) = (1, 1),
for which the associated optimal decision rules are equivalent to the posteriors, as given by
qn := arg min
q∈P(Y|X )
f(pn, q) ≡ pn(y = 1|x) =
{
n−1
2n−1 , if x = 0,
1, if x = 1.
Also, consider the similar sequence
p′n(x, y) :=

(n− 1)/2n, if (x, y) = (0, 0),
1/2, if (x, y) = (0, 1),
1/2n, if (x, y) = (1, 0),
0, if (x, y) = (1, 1),
and its associated optimal decision rules and posteriors
q′n := arg min
q∈P(Y|X )
f(p′n, q) ≡ p′n(y = 1|x) =
{
n
2n−1 , if x = 0,
0, if x = 1.
Note that both sequences converge to the same distribution,
p0(x, y) =
{
1/2, if x = 0,
0, if x = 1.
However, the corresponding optimal decision rule q0 := arg minq f(p0, q) is not unique, and constrained
only by q0(y|x = 0) = 1/2, while q0(y|x = 1) may be arbitrary. For Proposition 1 to be true, it would be
required, for any p ∈ D, that both f(p, qn) and f(p, q′n) converge to f(p, q0), however, there does not exist
a q0 such that both simultaneously converge to f(p, q0). For f(p, qn) to converge to f(p, q0), it would be
required that q0(y = 1|x = 1) = 1, while for f(p, q′n) to converge to f(p, q0), it would be required that
q0(y = 1|x = 1) = 0.
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